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GS 2: POLITY

THE HINDU PAGE: 06

Panel recommends targeted splitting of seats for next delimitation exercise

The model proposed by EAC-PM allows a 50% rise for all large States; dataset was based on elections to LS from 2009 to 2024; it results in increasing the size of Lok Sabha to 824 seats and is broadly in line with what the Centre had suggested when it brought the delimitation-related Bills in April

Varghese K. George
Abhinay Lakshman
NEW DELHI

The Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister (EAC-PM) has recommended multi-factor criteria for a "targeted" splitting of seats during India's next delimitation of Lok Sabha constituencies. The recommendations have been made in a new working paper that goes beyond population distribution and maintains the current proportion of Lok Sabha seats for all large States.

A model worked out by the EAC-PM on such criteria entails Kerala's Lok Sabha seats, for instance, rising from 20 to 30, Tamil Nadu's increasing from 39 to 59, and Uttar Pradesh's from 80 to 120 – broadly in line with what the Union government had suggested in April, when it brought the delimitation-related Bills but failed to pass them in Parliament.

The use of these criteria in the EAC-PM's model further suggested a doubling of the number of LS seats in smaller States and Union Territories such as Mizoram, Puducherry, Sikkim, Ladakh, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Nagaland, Chandigarh, and Lakshadweep. Out of the existing 543 seats, the EAC-PM's model suggests splitting a total of 170 seats, of which 59 constituencies have been recommended for a two-way split and 111 for a three-way split.

House of over 800 seats

The model results in increasing the size of the Lok Sabha to 824 seats. As per the Council, this will see the southern States' (Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu) aggregate share of seats in Lok Sabha come to 23.6% compared with the 23.7% currently.

Meanwhile, the share of the six most populous northern States (Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Bihar, and Maharashtra) will come to 45.2% as per the model, compared with the current 45.6%.

The existing proportion of seats-per-State was frozen based on the population figures of the 1971 Census. The freeze was brought in through a Constitutional Amendment in 1976.

While the EAC-PM notes that the next delimitation exercise is consequential because it would be the first time since then to allow altering per-State seat count, it does not comment on the underlying principle for essentially retaining the existing proportion of States' seats beyond saying that their model has been designed to "respect" the 50% per-State expansion.

Unique formula: The new working paper found a persistent gap in women's turnout in urban areas, even after constituency splits. PTI

The working paper, authored by EAC-PM member Shamika Ravi and Mudit Kapoor of the Indian Statistical Institute, says that its main objective was to address the following questions: "Which constituencies should be split, into how many parts, and on what criterion?"

In doing so, the EAC-PM said that it assembled a dataset on elections to LS seats from 2009 to 2024 to estimate a "statistical relationship" between voter turnout, constituency size, and five compositional features of the constituency (these include urban share, SC share, ST share, linguistic polarisation, and linguistic diversity).

The paper added that this estimated statistical relationship was then used to come up with a "turnout-maximising delimitation plan that splits the largest and most turnout-responsive constituencies into two or three parts".

Splitting constituencies

In the policy brief attached to the working paper, the EAC-PM goes on to recommend a "targeted criterion" for splitting constituencies instead of a "uniform one", adding that the "Delimitation Commission, when it is constituted after the 2027 Census", should "treat the joint demographic and linguistic profile of a candidate constituency, and not its size alone, as the criterion for splitting".

The Council went on to recommend that the Election Commission of India and the Ministry of Statistics should time the next delimitation exercise with a "fresh booth rationalising cycle" and the government should ensure that the "2027 Census tabulations and gender-disaggregated electoral statistics" are released on schedule.

It added that the working paper's model calculations showed that even after the splitting of constituencies, there remained a residual gap in the women's turnout percentages in urban areas, and thus recommended the EC to plan delimitation with measures like women-only polling booths and women-targeted voter roll update drives.

In their working paper-policy brief, Ms. Ravi and Mr. Kapoor further break down their study into six key findings. These deal with the relationship of different factors with constituency-wise voter turnouts. In one of its findings, the paper claimed that the model suggested by them is likely to lead to an overall increase of up to 2.3% in the voter turnout across the country in the next general election. The authors have, however, buttressed this with a caveat, saying that the gain in voter turnout would depend on which statistical specification is chosen, adding that the model was meant to answer what would happen when an electorate is reduced in size while retaining its composition.

The brief also says that between 2009 and 2024, the gap between voter turnouts in the smallest constituency and the largest constituency had halved. "Small constituencies descriptively out-vote large ones in 2024 because they sit on turnout-friendly compositional features (high ST share, low urban share, moderate linguistic polarisation), and not because they are small per se," it concluded.

The EAC-PM added that the demographic and linguistic measures used for the study were based on the 2011 Census and so would need to be updated with 2027 Census figures for a more reliable recalculation.

GS 3: INFRASTRUCUTRE AND INTERNAL SECURITY

THE HINDU PAGE: 06

74 new land ports proposed along International Border

Vijaita Singh
NEW DELHI

India proposes to build 74 additional land ports along the International Border in the coming years, which include three land ports along the China border and six along the Pakistan border, according to Land Ports Authority of India (LPAI) Chairperson Jayant Singh.

The new land ports are expected to strengthen trade and seamless movement of people with the neighbouring countries.

The land ports along the China border are proposed at Namgia in Himachal Pradesh, Gunji in Uttarakhand, and Nathu La in Sikkim. India does not have any other land port operational along the China border.

According to the External Affairs Ministry, three points are designated for conducting border trade between India and China – Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand (since 1992), Shipki La Pass in Himachal Pradesh (since 1995), and Nathu La Pass in Sikkim (since July 2006) but post-COVID pandemic in 2020, all trade is suspended. Trade points and land borders are different as the latter integrates immigration, customs and movement of large goods vehicles too.

Amit Shah during the inauguration of the Land Port Management System. ANI

The land ports planned along the Pakistan border are at Teetwal, Adusa, and Chakan Da Bagh in Jammu and Kashmir, Attari railway station and Hussainiwala in Punjab, and Munabao railway station in Rajasthan. At present, there is just one operational land port at Attari in Punjab and trade from the two Facilitation Centres located at Salamabad, Uri, Baramulla district and Chakkan-da-Bagh, Poonch district along Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir remained suspended since the Pulwama attack.

Under Phase II, 13 land ports are proposed along the Nepal border, 12 along the Bangladesh border, four along Bhutan and two along the Myanmar border, the presentation said.

GS 3: DISASTER MANAGEMENT

THE HINDU PAGE: 09

Major lacunae in reporting industrial accidents

The inconsistencies in the data compiled by the Labour Bureau and the DGFASLI point to severe lapses in reporting of industrial accidents

DATA POINT

Sambavi Parthasarathy
Pon Vasanth B.A.

The death toll from the explosion at the Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited-Visakhapatnam Steel Plant (RINL-VSP) on June 8, rose to nine on Wednesday. Following the incident, a familiar chain of bureaucratic responses has been triggered such as ex-gratia for the bereaved families and the constitution of an expert committee for a high-level probe. These were the same measures taken after the last major accident at the plant in 2014, and indeed after most workplace accidents across the country. But India appears to be lagging in strengthening institutional mechanisms needed to prevent such accidents **(Chart 2)**.

The problem begins with the very collection of safety data, as the gaps in the annual Standard Reference Notes (SRNs) of the Directorate General Factory Advice Service and Labour Institutes (DGFASLI) reveal. DGFASLI helps implement the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions (OSH) Code, 2020. The OSH, for which the rules were notified only last month, renamed the DGFASLI as the Directorate General of Occupational Safety and Health.

Each SRN records industrial accidents in two sections: one from data compiled by the Labour Bureau and the other from DGFASLI's own correspondence with Chief Inspectors of Factories. The two never match, pointing to lapses in reporting **(Chart 3)**.

The reports also show DGFASLI struggling with heavy vacancies **(Chart 4)**. The country does not have enough factory inspectors, even in industrialised States such as Tamil Nadu **(Chart 5)**. This gets consequently reflected in the small fraction of factories inspected each year **(Chart 6)**. Moreover, many States simply do not report the required details **(Chart 7)**.

Institutional apathy

Data for the charts were sourced from Standard Reference Notes (SRNs) and Accidental Deaths & Suicides in India (ADSI) reports. With inputs from Nitika Francis and Sandhya K, who is interning with *The Hindu*

Flames erupt in a steel plant after molten iron spills while being moved in a bucket by a crane in Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, on Monday, June 8. PTI

Chart 1: Deaths ( ) and injuries ( ) reported in fire accidents in factories, as per ADSI reports



Chart 2: The number of registered factories in each year ( ) and the number of employees in millions ( )



Chart 3: Fatal and non-fatal injuries as per the Labour Bureau (LB) and (CIFs), which vary widely over the years, with a few showing unexplained swings in the SRNS



Besides wide variations within the SRNs between the LB and CIFs' data, the fire accidents captured by them were only a third of the numbers reported in ADSI reports

Chart 4: The year-wise vacancies ( ) and filled positions ( ) in DGFASLI. Nearly 50% of the 349 sanctioned posts remained vacant as of 2023



Chart 5: Inspectors per factory among the States with the highest number of factories as of 2023

	Number of factories	Inspectors of Factories	Factories per inspector
Tamil Nadu	50,669	106	478
Gujarat	49,246	81	608
Maharashtra	39,533	44	898
Haryana	25,607	35	732
A.P.	24,642	42	587
Kerala	22,601	53	426
Telangana	22,118	27	819
Karnataka	18,389	48	383
Delhi	13,616	7	1,945
Rajasthan	11,014	27	408

Chart 6: The share of factories inspected by DGFASLI each year (in %). The inspections have dropped significantly in the recent years, perhaps due to the staff crunch



Chart 7: Many States did not furnish data on fatal and non-fatal incidents, either to the Labour Bureau, or DGFASLI, as per the SRNs. U.P., Karnataka and W.B. did not provide data even once



GS 3: ECONOMY

THE HINDU PAGE: 10

The reality behind falling net FDI

India's net FDI has declined sharply despite strong gross inflows, underlining the impact of disinvestment/capital repatriation; investor classes, modes of entry, and exit strategies can have important implications for technology transfer, industrial development, and external sustainability

ECONOMIC NOTES

K.S. Chalapati Rao
Biswajit Dhar
K.V.K. Ranganathan

India's net foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined drastically in recent years. Critics see the weak net flows as a sign of weakness, while the Chief Economic Adviser points to the large inflows and rising manufacturing FDI as evidence of strength. He links weak net flows to profit repatriation and outward investment by Indian companies.

However, this debate overlooks a major issue. By focusing on overall numbers, both sides ignore the changing composition of international capital and the Balance of Payments (BoP) mechanisms that govern inflows and outflows.

For BoP purposes, net FDI is calculated as the difference between inflows and outflows after adjusting for the repatriation of capital. From the peak of $44.0 billion in 2020-21, net FDI fell to less than $1 billion in 2024-25. It recovered to $7.6 billion in 2025-26. The corresponding gross inflow was $94.6 billion.

It is necessary to note that India's liberal FDI policy, introduced in 1991, initially emphasised technology acquisition, export promotion, and foreign exchange conservation. Over time, policy increasingly prioritised attracting larger inflows, while concerns regarding future external payment obligations and investment quality receded.

GETTY IMAGES

THE GIST

- Real FDI accounted for 41.9% of effective inflows between 2022-23 and 2025-26, while financial investors contributed 40.5%, reflecting the growing role of private equity, venture capital, and sovereign wealth funds.
- Real FDI into manufacturing has declined across three consecutive four-year periods, with manufacturing receiving only 10.6% of total effective inflows in the latest period.
- Gross FDI figures include transactions such as intra-group ownership reorganisations, mergers, share swaps, and conversion of external commercial borrowings, even when no fresh capital enters the country.

Three types of FDI

FDI is often viewed as a uniform, long-term commitment that brings technology and management skills to the host country. FDI can fall into three different investor classes, each with distinct capabilities, strategies, and exit timelines.

The first category is real FDI (RFDI), consisting of traditional multinational enterprises with the technology, brands, and capabilities to establish production and services. These generally represent long-term commitments.

The second category comprises financial investors, including private equity funds, venture capital firms, sovereign wealth funds, and asset managers. Their main goal is capital growth and planned exits.

The third category includes diaspora investments and special purpose vehicles (SPVs). These involve capital raised abroad and funneled through offshore financial centres, sometimes including the round-tripping of Indian funds.

Data on remittance-level FDI from the past four years, from 2022-23 to 2025-26 up to December, show that RFDI made up 41.9% of "effective inflows." Financial investors followed closely with a 40.5% share, while the remaining 17.6% came from the diaspora and SPVs linked to India.

The business model of financial investors suggests future exits that result in large-scale capital repatriations. A notable example occurred in 2025 when Singapore's Temasek exited Schneider Electric India Ltd., earning $6.4 billion on an investment of $637 million made in 2020. Total recorded divestment in CY 2025 was $52 billion, with 45 major foreign private equity and venture capital exits accounting for $29 billion in outflows.

Based on an analysis of effective inflows, FDI in India's manufacturing sector has declined across three consecutive four-year periods. Most notably, RFDI into manufacturing accounted for only 10.6% of total effective inflows during the most recent four-year period.

Not fresh capital

A major blind spot in gross FDI figures is the mixing of new capital injections with corporate accounting changes, such as intra-group ownership reorganisations, mergers, share swaps, and the conversion of earlier non-equity instruments such as external commercial borrowings (ECBs) and convertible debentures.

While capital structures change, no new capital flows into the country. Approximately $40 billion of the $560 billion in equity inflows to India from 2014-15 to 2025-26 (up to December) fall into this category. Large transactions, such as Bosch and Meesho Technologies, can skew annual inflow and sectoral trends.

Disinvestment drives decline

Before looking at why net FDI is low or even negative in certain months, it is worth mentioning that the official narrative that profit repatriation depresses net FDI is misleading.

Under BoP conventions, profits sent as dividends are recorded as investment income in the current account. They increase the current account deficit (CAD) but do not change the reported net FDI flows. Instead, the primary reason for weak net FDI is disinvestment and capital repatriation, which appear in the financial account.

Likewise, the increase in Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) warrants closer examination rather than being attributed solely to corporate maturity. From 2023-24 to 2025-26, 45% of India's total outbound investment of $65 billion went into the "financial, insurance, and business services" (FIB) sector. Singapore and the UAE accounted for 27% and 11% of the total, respectively. These funds mostly go to holding companies and SPVs rather than directly to operational entities. For instance, TML Commercial Vehicles, a subsidiary of Tata Motors, invested $405 million in a Singaporean FIB entity to acquire the IVECO Group in Italy.

Capital movements through the GIFT City further complicate this issue. OFDI to the City increased from $246 million in 2023-24 to $1.18 billion in 2025-26. Total OFDI and inward FDI through it until 2025-26 reached $2.35 billion and $1.40 billion, respectively, highlighting the growing two-way flows.

These cross-flow of investments by Indian entities, also from other locations, indicates that OFDI can represent both genuine corporate expansion and the return of capital that fled. Therefore, increasing OFDI may not necessarily indicate maturity, as Indian companies might seek resources and technology, while a few might recycle capital through different jurisdictions.

Understanding the outflow channels

From 2022-23 to 2025-26, total FDI inflows and related current and capital account outflows reached significant levels. While gross inward equity FDI totalled $317.80 billion ($230.60 billion excluding reinvested earnings), the outflows present a more complex scenario.

Disinvestment and capital repatriation (capital account) totalled $178.9 billion, primarily driven by financial investors through secondary and strategic sales, IPO exits, and share buybacks. This also includes "offers for sale" by foreign promoters such as Hyundai and LG. The other type involves sell-offs by RFDI investors, such as Wistron which sold off to the Tatas.

Dividend remittances (current account) amounted to $188.9 billion in profits paid out by MNE subsidiaries and affiliates, excluding reinvested earnings.

Attributable IPR payments (current account) totalled $46.6 billion. These payments, made by MNE subsidiaries and affiliates for intellectual property (assuming they account for 75% of total IPR payments), can substitute dividends.

Additionally, $250.0 billion was transferred by all entities for technical/service/consultancy payments. However, it is difficult to divide this amount between RFDI and domestic companies.

Even when excluding OFDI and technical service payments, outflows due to disinvestment, dividends, and IPR payments (royalties) totalled $344.4 billion. Therefore, for every dollar of fresh inflow (excluding reinvested earnings), approximately $1.50 flowed out. This situation has worsened over the past 12 years. The corresponding outflow per dollar entered was 56 cents from 2014-15 to 2017-18, rising to 70 cents from 2018-19 to 2021-22, before reaching the current high.

Need for informed debate

The above narrative shows how an incomplete view of FDI prevails in the public discourse. Different types of investors, entry methods, and exit strategies impact technology transfer, industrial growth, and external sustainability. The reporting of global FDI flows adds an additional layer of problems. Understanding these nuances is crucial for evaluating FDI beyond headline numbers.

(K.S. Chalapati Rao is Senior Research Fellow at the Academy of Business Studies, Biswajit Dhar is former Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and K.V.K. Ranganathan is an independent researcher)

GS 3: ENERGY
THE HINDU PAGE: 12

Indian reservoirs can host 102 GW floating solar

Jacob Koshy
NEW DELHI

India's reservoirs can host about 102 gigawatt (GW) of floating solar capacity, as per the first comprehensive national assessment of the technology's potential by the National Institute of Solar Energy, an autonomous institute of the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. The report titled "Solar PV Potential of India (Floating Solar)" frames panels on water as a way around one of the most intractable obstacles in the solar sector – land.

The assessment, however, has no calculation of what it would cost to realise this potential. Its only cost reference is a 2021 benchmark from U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory, which the report cites to note floating units cost about 25% more upfront than ground-mounted ones owing to floats, anchoring and waterproofing.

"We are in discussions with the Finance Ministry to promote floating solar and agri-photovoltaics," Santosh Kumar Sarangi, Secretary, MNRE said.

Water power: An aerial view of the floating solar panels on the Mudasarlova reservoir in Visakhapatnam. FILE PHOTO

Agri-photovoltaics refer to farm beds that are sheltered by structures on which solar panels are mounted.

Acquiring land

Ground-mounted solar systems, which dominate India's about 100 GW of installed solar capacity, need 3-4 times more area/MW than the panels themselves occupy. Land acquisition, which is costly, slow and prone to conflict with agriculture and habitation, continues to be a choke-point as India pursues 500 GW non-fossil capacity by 2030. Floating solar is 'land neutral', the report underlines.

NISE arrived at its estimate by passing India's inland water bodies via six geospatial filters: lakes and reservoirs larger than 10 hectare, water present for at least 11 months/year, depths of 3-30 metre, solar irradiance above 4.5 kWh/m²/day and proximity within 10 km of roads and substations. Demonstrated at Odisha's Hirakud reservoir, the filters whittled 499 sq. km. of water down to 99.5 sq. km. of usable surface. Applied nationwide, they yielded 1,946 sq. km. of feasible area with a self-imposed cap of 20% of any reservoir's surface, translating to 102.18 GW. Maharashtra (16.28 GW), Madhya Pradesh (14.89 GW), Karnataka (13.69 GW), Odisha (12.81 GW) and Telangana (10.72 GW) account for the bulk.

Flagship solar park

India's flagship is the Omkareshwar floating solar park on River Narmada in Madhya Pradesh's Khandwa district – at 278 MW, the country's largest with plans to scale to 600 MW. Yet NISE's field observations there recorded loosening float joints, misaligned platforms and uneven buoyancy alongside reports from developers of electric cables breaking. Globally, floating solar reached about 9.6 GW by 2024, almost 90% of it in Asia. China leads with installations such as a 120 MW plant on fish farm in Poyang Lake; Singapore's 1 MW Tengeh reservoir test bed supplied much of the field's performance data and Netherlands accounts for about 3/4th of Europe's capacity built largely on quarry lakes.

GS 1: MODERN HISTORY INDIAN EXPRESS

PAGE: 06

• HISTORY

How Birsa Munda helped define Adivasi identity, rights

Shubham Tigga
Ranchi, June 10

ON JUNE 9, the death anniversary of the iconic Adivasi leader and freedom fighter Birsa Munda, several tribal organisations in Jharkhand took a pledge to "protect his legacy". This pledge came amid the fresh demands for "delisting" — removing tribal converts to Christianity or Islam from the Scheduled Tribes (ST) list — that have re-ignited a long-running debate over Adivasi identity. The latest delisting demand was made last month at a tribal gathering attended by Union Home Minister Amit Shah in Delhi.

The tribal organisations in Jharkhand said during the pledge event that Birsa Munda's vision was rooted in Adivasi identity, sovereignty and land rights, and accused right-wing groups of attempting to reinterpret that outlook.

So what did Birsa stand for? More than 125 years after his death, here's a look at the tribal leader's life, beliefs and legacy.

Who was Birsa Munda?

Birsa Munda is one of the most influential figures in the history of the Chotanagpur plateau, the mineral-rich region spanning Jharkhand and adjoining states.

Revered by many as "Dharti Aba" (father of the Earth), he is remembered for leading the Ulgulan, or the "Great Tumult" — a movement against colonial rule and "diku" (non-tribal outsider) zamindars amid the growing encroachment on Adivasi land and cultural institutions in the closing years of the 19th century.

Birsa's influence, however, extended beyond the borders of the current Jharkhand state to the remote villages of Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and more. In his seminal study *Birsa Munda and His Movement*, historian K S Singh described Birsa as a religious reformer, social mobiliser and political leader who transformed the Munda tribal society.

Adivasi historian Joseph Bara similarly argues that Birsa cannot be understood merely as the leader of an agrarian uprising. Rather, he articulated a broader vision of Adivasi identity, autonomy, land rights, religion and self-rule (known as *disum*).

Bara notes that his prominence in mainstream political and public discourse grew significantly during the decades preceding and following the creation of Jharkhand in 2000.

From resistance to statehood

The Ulgulan, led by Birsa Munda, reached its climax at Dombari Buru, a hill in a Khunti village, in January 1899. This was where thousands of Birsa's followers gathered to assert their rights over land and challenge British authority, according to historian K S Singh.

The British forces eventually surrounded the hill and fired into the crowd. In Adivasi memory, this was a massacre that killed hundreds, though official records estimate a much lower toll. Birsa was arrested and died in Ranchi Jail on June 9, 1900.

While the British may have crushed the uprising, Dombari Buru became a symbol of Adivasi resistance.

The episode compelled the colonial administration to initiate land reforms that culminated in legal recognition of Khuntkatti rights and later the Chotanagpur Tenancy (CNT) Act, 1908. Khuntkatti was the traditional Munda system of collective land ownership and governance. Under the system, the descendants of the original settlers who cleared forests and established a village, known as Khuntkattidars, held collective rights over the village territory.

Bara writes that the aspiration for Adivasi self-governance articulated during Ulgulan was later channelled into the movement for a separate Jharkhand under Jaipal Singh Munda in the mid-1900s.

Religious views

According to family accounts shared by Budhram Munda, a descendant of the family, Birsa spent parts of his early childhood at his uncle's village before studying at missionary schools in Chaibasa.

Budhram Munda said that Birsa's association with missionary education ended after a disagreement with church authorities over remarks about the Munda tribal community. After distancing himself from Christianity, Birsa came under the influence of Vaishnavism for some time.

"He was jailed in 1885 for two years and, eventually, after being released, he started preaching his teachings towards life and nature...," said Budhram Munda.

These teachings created a religious movement that came to be known as the Birsait faith, different from Sarnaism (the traditional tribal faith), Christianity and Hinduism. His followers attribute various miracles to him and consider him a messiah, referring to him as "Bhagwan" and the aforementioned "Dharti Aba".

Budhram Munda said: "Bhagwan Birsa never targeted any particular religion. He opposed both the outsiders from the caste society who were appointed as zamindars, and the Christian missionaries, as he saw them as part of the same system of exploitation," he said. Opposing the demand for delisting of Christian tribals from the ST list, Budhram Munda said that descendants of Birsa's family have followed Christianity for generations. He argued that Adivasi identity is determined by ancestry and community, not religion.

What is the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act?

- The CNT Act was enacted by the British in 1908 after decades of Adivasi resistance (including Birsa Munda's uprising) to protect customary land rights in Chotanagpur region.
- The central objective was preventing the transfer of Adivasi land to non-Adivasis and legally recognising traditional land tenure systems.
- The Act remains one of the strongest safeguards for tribal land in Jharkhand.