



**Sanskriti IAS**



**THE HINDU**



**The Indian EXPRESS**

# **SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT EDITORIALS**

**3rd June 2026**

## **TOPICS:-**

**1. How land pooling solves acquisition woes**

(GS Paper II Governance)

**2. Need to strengthen existing health facilities**

(GS Paper II Governance)

**3. Take the right reform lessons from Indonesia, don't dress up a flawed system**

(GS Paper III Economy)

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# 1. HOW LAND POOLING SOLVES ACQUISITION WOES

*(GS Paper II Governance)*

This editorial 'How land pooling solves acquisition woes' was published in The Hindu on 3rd Jun 2026, highlights how land pooling can ease urban land acquisition through participatory, flexible and locally adapted planning mechanisms.

## Acquisition Crisis and Land Pooling Alternative

- Urban projects face delays because land acquisition has become complex, costly and contested, especially after the rehabilitation obligations under the 2013 Act.
- Large-scale acquisition has become financially difficult, widening the gap between planned infrastructure and implementation due to the inability to mobilise land.
- Land pooling offers a voluntary model where owners contribute land for infrastructure development and receive serviced plots, reducing displacement and distributing gains.
- Town Planning schemes have worked in Gujarat and Maharashtra by using 25-40% land for roads, parks, amenities and EWS housing, while returning 60-75% as improved plots.
- The model is participatory and self-financing because incremental charges from landowners are recovered during development, reducing upfront public expenditure.

## Gujarat Model and Uneven Replication

- Gujarat formalised land pooling through the 1976 Act, planning over 1,000 sq. km across Ahmedabad, Surat, Rajkot, Vadodara and Gandhinagar.
- Compared with acquisition, TP schemes reduce displacement, enable benefit-sharing and support faster urban growth while preserving environmentally sensitive areas.
- Maharashtra failed to update its legal provisions, though Pune and MMRDA recently revived TP schemes for serviced land in peripheral urban areas.
- Guwahati's attempt faced weak implementation due to unclear land appropriation shares, undefined institutional roles, manual records and gaps between revenue records and ground conditions.
- Guwahati reduced delays by using existing map areas and revenue records, while lowering owner contribution to 12-15% made the scheme more acceptable.

## Local Flexibility as the Decisive Factor

- Rajasthan had statutory provisions since 2016, but lack of experience delayed implementation, prompting changes in land-value calculations to limit owner burden.
- Rajasthan's decision to absorb part of the cost made the scheme more equitable and attractive for landowners.
- States such as Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi must first build landowner trust, communicate benefits and adapt the approach to local land markets.
- The success of TP schemes depends on legislation, contribution rules, financial design and institutional capacity, not on mechanical replication of Gujarat's model.

## BEYOND EDITORIAL

### Equity Risks in Market-Led Urban Land Assembly

- **Small-owner stress:** Land pooling may look voluntary, but small holders can face distress if Delhi-like serviced plots are delayed or charges rise.
- **Tenant invisibility:** Land pooling recognises landowners, while tenant farmers and informal workers may lose livelihoods, as seen in peri-urban expansion.
- **Speculation risk:** New roads and services can inflate land values, encouraging speculation and displacement, as seen around urban expressway corridors.
- **Consent imbalance:** Unequal information and official pressure can make pooling indirectly coercive, especially where small farmers face powerful developers.
- **Affordable housing gap:** If pooled land serves high-value real estate, cities may repeat Gurugram-like exclusion of rental and low-income housing.
- **Record disputes:** Unclear titles and outdated revenue records can delay pooling schemes, as seen in many urban villages and peri-urban areas.
- **Social safeguards:** Land pooling needs grievance redressal, transparent valuation and non-owner inclusion, as attempted through Delhi's policy safeguards.

## 2. NEED TO STRENGTHEN EXISTING HEALTH FACILITIES

*(GS Paper II Governance)*

This editorial '**Need to strengthen existing health facilities**' was published in **The Hindu** on 3rd Jun 2026, highlights how **Kerala's plan for new medical colleges** risks neglecting stressed public health institutions needing staff, funds and upgradation.

## Political Push for New Medical Colleges

- Kerala's new **UDF government** plans two more medical colleges in Thiruvananthapuram and Harippad, reviving projects earlier linked to political prestige.
- Supporters see limited scope for expanding existing colleges, while the government argues that converting hospitals into **tertiary care** and research centres remains feasible.
- The proposed Thiruvananthapuram college involves developing the **General Hospital**, while Harippad is politically significant because it is linked to the Home Minister's constituency.

## Stress Within Existing Health Infrastructure

- Kerala joined the Centre's campaign for one **medical college** in every district, but many older institutions in less developed regions still lack infrastructure, faculty and support staff.
- Creating new institutions may earn political credit, but it could weaken existing facilities without adequate **government patronage**, recruitment, funding and upgradation.
- Poor research facilities, uncertain career pathways and weak medical infrastructure may be deterring younger **doctors** from entering medical colleges.
- Overworked medical and non-medical staff have reduced **service quality**, weakening public confidence in Kerala's famed public healthcare model.

## Public Health Crisis and Policy Priority

- The previous LDF government faced criticism over building collapses, shortage of **medicines**, inadequate surgical materials and repeated medical negligence complaints.
- Kerala's healthcare stress contributed to public anger against the previous government, showing that **institutional neglect** can carry political as well as social costs.
- Strengthening the existing **public healthcare network**, rather than creating new institutions, should be the State's immediate priority.

## BEYOND EDITORIAL

### From Hospital Expansion to Continuum of Care

- **Primary care pressure:** Medical colleges cannot reduce overload unless Kerala's FHCs, PHCs and district hospitals manage routine and preventive care.
- **Referral discipline:** Clear referrals can prevent AIIMS-like overcrowding in tertiary hospitals and ensure serious cases receive timely specialist attention.
- **Ageing burden:** Kerala's ageing population needs NCD clinics, palliative care and home support, not only more medical seats or buildings.
- **Workforce retention:** Better recruitment, housing and career pathways are essential to prevent doctors and nurses from avoiding public institutions.
- **Supply reliability:** Regular medicines, diagnostics and surgical materials decide hospital credibility, as seen in Jan Aushadhi and Karunya models.
- **Public trust:** Patients lose confidence when buildings collapse, medicines vanish or negligence complaints rise, even if new hospitals are announced.
- **System integration:** Kerala needs linked primary, secondary and tertiary care, where medical colleges support training, research and referrals.

## 3. TAKE THE RIGHT REFORM LESSONS FROM INDONESIA, DON'T DRESS UP A FLAWED SYSTEM

*(GS Paper III Economy)*

This editorial 'Take the right reform lessons from Indonesia, don't dress up a flawed system' was published in The Indian Express on 3rd Jun 2026, highlights how India drew the wrong lessons from Indonesia's BIT reforms by protecting a flawed legal system instead of reforming it.

### Indonesia's Reform Lesson

- Indonesia scrapped existing BITs in 2014 after cases by Churchill Mining and Newmont, but paired treaty withdrawal with institutional clean-up.
- In the Churchill Mining case, local courts found forged mining-concession documents, leading to licence cancellation and exposure of corruption-linked approvals.

- Anti-corruption action by KPK against officials showed that Indonesia addressed domestic governance failures instead of merely blaming foreign investors.
- Investor fears proved overstated as inward FDI rose from about \$11 billion annually before 2015 to \$20 billion after the new framework.
- Indonesia's new approach retained arbitration access after a six-month cooling-off period, showing reform without excessive legal obstruction.

### **India's Defensive BIT Architecture**

- India cancelled existing BITs in 2016 after the White Industries dispute, but copied Indonesia's treaty withdrawal without similar domestic reform.
- The White Industries case arose from delays involving Coal India and Indian courts, where a decade passed without effective resolution.
- India's 2015 Model BIT became highly restrictive by imposing a 60-month wait before international arbitration could begin.
- Mandatory prior recourse to Indian courts made the framework defensive, converting arbitration protection into prolonged procedural delay.
- The 2025 Budget proposes reducing court-reconciliation time from five to three years, but still preserves the flawed court-first dispute mechanism.

### **FDI Data and Governance Signal**

- The CEA's claim that BITs have weak FDI impact is questioned because gross inflow figures hide repatriated profits and capital outflows.
- India's inward FDI of \$94.5 billion in 2025-26 weakens after adjustment, with net FDI only around \$41 billion.
- As a share of GDP, net FDI stood near a record low, suggesting investor confidence cannot be judged by headline inflows alone.
- Indonesia gained investor trust by improving rule of law, while India appeared to shield legal delays through a restrictive treaty design.
- The real lesson is that capital responds better to credible institutional reform than to legal barriers protecting inefficient systems.

## BEYOND EDITORIAL

### Rule of Law as India's Real Investment Incentive

- **Contract enforcement:** Investors value enforceable contracts more than treaty language, as White Industries showed how court delays create long legal uncertainty.
- **Judicial capacity:** Commercial Courts Act benches, strict timelines and case management can reduce arbitration dependence and improve investor confidence.
- **Regulatory certainty:** Stable taxation and licensing rules matter because Vodafone-like retrospective disputes raise the perceived cost of investing in India.
- **State accountability:** Government agencies must honour contracts and awards, since Devas-Antrix-type disputes weaken India's credibility with investors.
- **ADR ecosystem:** Strong mediation, institutional arbitration and enforceable settlements, under the Mediation Act, 2023, can reduce prolonged litigation.
- **Domestic investors:** Rule-of-law reform helps Indian firms too, as weak enforcement discourages MSME investment as much as foreign capital.
- **Reform signal:** A credible legal system attracts investment by protecting rights through institutions, not defensive treaty restrictions or court-first barriers.