



EDITORIALS - 26TH SEP 2026

1. The case for accountable lottery regulation in India (GS Paper II Governance)

This editorial '**The case for accountable lottery regulation in India**' was published in **The Hindu** on 26th Sep 2026, highlights how accountable **regulation** could curb **lottery harms** while preserving **State revenue** and oversight.

Why regulation is needed

- **Lottery harms** fall disproportionately on poorer households; rapid draws, instant games and large jackpots can encourage compulsive play and loss-chasing.
- **Prohibition** can shift players to illegal lotteries and offshore platforms that lack age checks, prize safeguards and fraud remedies, while reducing public revenue.
- **Financial markets** also expose adults to serious losses, yet remain legal under disclosure and fraud controls; the editorial argues for stricter safeguards for lotteries rather than a ban.
- The **U.S. alcohol prohibition** of 1920–33 illustrates how suppressing legal supply can foster black markets and raise enforcement costs.

Regulatory models and India's position

- Lotteries are legal in nearly **four-fifths of countries**; nearly **70% of lottery jurisdictions** use a public-operator model, while others license private operators.
- The **Lok Sabha reply of March 14, 2023** identified nine States operating lotteries; the **Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998** permits State-organised lotteries subject to statutory conditions.
- **Cross-border sales** elsewhere generally require destination-jurisdiction consent or cooperation, allowing States to pool players and prizes while retaining regulatory autonomy.

Legal changes proposed

- **Supreme Court jurisprudence** places gambling outside Article 19(1)(g)'s trade protection; Section 5 of the 1998 Act lets States prohibit lotteries organised by other States.
- In **B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. (1999)**, the Court held that a State must abandon its own lottery before excluding other States' lotteries. The editorial questions this all-or-nothing rule because oversight and enforcement burdens differ.
- **Section 5** should be amended to make a destination State's consent decisive: it could admit all outside lotteries or exclude them all, whether or not it runs its own.

- A proposed **Section 4A** would let consenting States operate a common lottery, pooling players, prizes, technology and costs.
- **Section 4** already allows ticket sales through agents or distributors; the editorial favours more transparent departmental operation and wider retail participation. Kerala's public-operator model yielded **₹2,883.80 crore** in net lottery revenue and State Goods and Services Tax in 2023–24.

BEYOND EDITORIAL

Public Health Response to Gambling Addiction

- **Clinical recognition:** The World Health Organization classifies gambling disorder as a behavioural disorder, providing a basis for screening and treatment through health services.
- **Specialist care:** England's National Health Service runs gambling treatment clinics, showing how addiction support can be offered outside lottery regulators and enforcement agencies.
- **Effective treatment:** London's National Gambling Clinic offers cognitive behavioural therapy to help patients manage harmful gambling and prevent relapse.
- **Family support:** National Health Service clinics offer family therapy and aftercare, recognising that gambling-related debt and distress also affect households.
- **Self-exclusion:** Britain's GAMSTOP scheme lets a person block access to participating online gambling operators through one request, reducing opportunities for impulsive play.
- **Spending limits:** British rules require online operators to offer deposit limits, an example of helping players set a financial boundary before losses accumulate.
- **Dedicated funding:** England uses a statutory levy on gambling operators to fund independent harm-prevention and treatment services, rather than relying solely on voluntary industry support.

2. Revisiting India's nuclear doctrine without revising it (GS Paper III Security)

This editorial '**Revisiting India's nuclear doctrine without revising it**' was published in **The Hindu** on 26th Sep 2026, highlights the need to reassess India's **nuclear deterrence** amid strategic and technological change while retaining its **core principles**.

Doctrinal foundations

- The **2003 nuclear doctrine** rests on credible minimum deterrence, **No First Use**, massive retaliation after a nuclear attack, survivable second-strike capability and civilian control.

- The doctrine retains an option for nuclear retaliation after a major **biological or chemical attack** on India or its forces; its core principles have provided continuity for over two decades.

Changed security environment

- Closer **China–Pakistan cooperation**, China’s military expansion and Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons raise the possibility of linked pressures during a crisis.
- **Artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, space surveillance, hypersonic weapons and missile defence** shorten decision time and strain command-and-control and assured-retaliation assumptions.
- **Indo-Pacific competition** and a more multipolar order place regional nuclear crises within wider geopolitical rivalries.

Review without doctrinal revision

- A review should assess whether **massive retaliation** provides sufficient deterrent clarity against Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons without necessarily changing the doctrine’s principles.
- Changing the declared **No First Use** policy could increase uncertainty and complicate crisis management; the editorial instead favours clarifying its scope and rationale.
- Priority should go to survivable **second-strike forces**, resilient command and control, intelligence, early warning, cyber resilience and a credible nuclear triad.

BEYOND EDITORIAL

Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures

- **Facility protection:** India and Pakistan exchanged lists of nuclear installations on January 1, 2026, under their agreement prohibiting attacks on such facilities.
- **Missile-test notice:** Their **2005 agreement** provides for advance notification of ballistic-missile flight tests, reducing the risk of a test being mistaken for an attack.
- **Accident notification:** A **2007 agreement** requires prompt communication about nuclear-weapons accidents that could cause cross-border fallout or create a risk of war.
- **Political commitment:** The **1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding** established a framework for bilateral nuclear confidence-building, even when wider relations remained difficult.
- **Military hotline:** The two Directors General of Military Operations used their established hotline in February 2021 to agree on observance of the ceasefire.
- **Expert dialogue:** India and Pakistan held expert-level talks on nuclear confidence-building measures in 2007, showing a channel for technical risk-reduction discussions.

- **Emerging risks:** Similar communication protocols could cover unexpected cyber or space-related incidents, where incomplete information might otherwise cause miscalculation during a crisis.

3. A declining United Nations is not good news for a rising India (GS Paper II International Relations)

This editorial 'A declining United Nations is not good news for a rising India' was published in **The Indian Express** on 26th Sep 2026, highlights why India needs an **effective United Nations** to shape **rules** and protect its **interests**.

Why a weaker United Nations matters to India

- **Security Council vetoes** and major-power rivalry have constrained action on Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan and the Iran–Gulf conflict.
- **Unilateral restrictions** can disrupt Indian trade when foreign banks or insurers refuse transactions permitted under Indian law; rival financial and technology systems could deepen this dependence.
- Despite Council paralysis, **universal membership** gives smaller countries a voice, while United Nations agencies provide relief and support climate and development negotiations.
- The **United Nations** also needs simpler procedures and adequate funding; governments weaken its mandates when they withhold payments or assistance.

India's role in shaping rules

- **Artificial intelligence governance** will affect security, employment and development; India should press for safety and access rules that include developing countries, not only major powers and technology firms.
- India joined **Partners for Multilateralism** on September 21 with countries across diplomatic camps to oppose economic coercion and build support for joint proposals.
- India's case for **permanent Security Council membership** is strong, but regional objections and the requirement of ratification by all five permanent members make an elected seat the nearer prospect.
- India should seek support for its **2028–29 elected seat** bid by drawing on its record of over **275,000 peacekeeping personnel** and advocating feasible mandates and a voice for affected countries.

Beyond Editorial

Accountability for Security Council Vetoes

- **Assembly scrutiny:** Under **Resolution 76/262**, the General Assembly debates a vetoed issue; it did so after the United States blocked Palestine's membership recommendation in 2024.
- **Written record:** The Security Council submitted a special report on that **2024 veto**, documenting the blocked draft for examination by the wider membership.
- **Public explanation:** General Assembly debate gives the vetoing State an opportunity to defend its decision before all members, increasing political scrutiny without removing its legal power.
- **Atrocity restraint:** The **France–Mexico initiative** asks permanent members to voluntarily forgo vetoes in mass-atrocity situations; it remains a proposal rather than a binding rule.
- **Wider commitment:** The **ACT Code of Conduct** asks all Security Council members to support credible action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
- **Alternative forum:** Following Security Council paralysis over Ukraine in 2022, the General Assembly met in an emergency special session under the **Uniting for Peace** framework.
- **Limits of scrutiny:** These mechanisms can expose and challenge a veto, but they cannot reverse it; the 2024 Palestine membership draft remained blocked despite subsequent Assembly debate.