Collapse of the US–Russia Nuclear Control Regime: Entering a New Age of Strategic Competition

Why in News ?

The expiry of the New START Treaty marks the end of nearly five decades of legally binding nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia. With no successor agreement in place, global concerns have intensified over strategic instability, reduced transparency, and the risk of a renewed nuclear arms race among major powers.

Background and Context

• Since the Cold War, the United States and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) have possessed the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, accounting for nearly 90% of global nuclear weapons.
• To prevent catastrophic escalation and accidental war, both sides gradually developed a dense network of arms control treaties governing:
  • Nuclear warheads,
  • Delivery systems,
  • Missile defence,
  • Verification and inspections.
• These agreements served three critical purposes:
  • Capping arsenals,
  • Reducing stockpiles,
  • Building trust and predictability.
  • The expiry of New START in February 2026 ends the last surviving pillar of this architecture, creating a legal and strategic vacuum in nuclear governance.

Cold War Arms Control Efforts

Strategic Context of the 1960s

• By the late 1960s, the Soviet Union was rapidly expanding its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal to match US capabilities.
• In January 1967, US President Lyndon B. Johnson warned that Moscow was developing an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system around its capital, raising fears that one side might gain a destabilising first-strike advantage.

SALT Talks and Early Treaties

• To restrain this competition, Washington and Moscow launched the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in November 1969.
• These talks produced two landmark agreements:
  • Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty: Limited missile defence systems to 200 (later 100) per side, preserving mutual vulnerability and strategic stability.
  • Interim SALT Accord: Froze the expansion of ICBM capabilities.

SALT II and Its Collapse

• Negotiations for SALT II began in 1972 and culminated in a 1979 agreement limiting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers) to 2,250 each.
• However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, US President Jimmy Carter withdrew the treaty from Senate ratification, and it never entered into force.

Unravelling of Controls

• In 2002, the United States withdrew unilaterally from the ABM Treaty, arguing that it restricted missile defences against terrorist and rogue-state threats.
• This withdrawal marked the beginning of the erosion of Cold War–era arms control structures.

Post–Cold War Nuclear Arms Reduction

START I: Deep Cuts with Verification

• After the Cold War, the US and Russia signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991.
• It capped:
  • Strategic delivery systems at 1,600,
  • Nuclear warheads at 6,000.
• Importantly, it mandated:
  • Physical destruction of excess missiles and bombers,
  • Intrusive verification through on-site inspections, data exchanges, and satellite monitoring.
  • Due to the Soviet Union’s collapse and denuclearisation of former Soviet states, implementation took longer and was completed only in December 2001.
  • START I expired in 2009.

START II: An Unfulfilled Follow-On

• Signed in January 1993, START II aimed to reduce warheads further to 3,000–3,500.
• However, delays in ratification and political tensions prevented its entry into force.
• After the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia withdrew from START II, and prospects for a START III collapsed.

SORT: A Temporary Bridge

• In May 2002, the two countries adopted the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).
• It committed both sides to reduce operationally deployed warheads to 1,700–2,200.
• SORT came into force in 2003 and was conceived as a temporary arrangement, later superseded by New START in 2011.

A New Phase in US–Russia Arms Control

New START: Renewal of Strategic Restraint

• In 2010, US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
• It entered into force on February 5, 2011, marking a renewed commitment to arms control.

Key Limits and Reductions

• New START capped:
  • Strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550,
  • Strategic delivery vehicles at 800 (deployed and non-deployed combined).
• This required:
  • Around a 30% reduction in warheads,
  • Nearly a 50% reduction in delivery vehicles compared to SORT.

Verification and Inspections

• The treaty established a robust verification regime:
  • Up to 18 on-site inspections per year,
  • Regular data exchanges,
  • Notifications of movements and deployments.

Extension and Expiry

• The treaty allowed a one-time extension.
• In 2021, the US and Russia extended New START by five years, setting its expiry at February 5, 2026.

After New START: What Lies Ahead

1. End of Legal Limits on Nuclear Arsenals

• With the treaty’s expiry, binding caps on US and Russian nuclear warheads cease to exist.
• As of 2025:
  • The US possesses approximately 5,277 warheads,
  • Russia holds about 5,449 warheads.
• Without constraints, both sides could expand or modernise their arsenals freely.

2. Rising Risks and Loss of Transparency

• The absence of inspections and data exchanges reduces mutual visibility into nuclear forces.
• This heightens the risk of:
  • Miscalculation,
  • Accidental escalation,
  • Arms racing driven by worst-case assumptions.

3. Erosion of Nuclear Deterrence Stability

• Traditional nuclear deterrence relied on:
  • Mutual vulnerability,
  • Predictability,
  • Structured competition.
• The breakdown of arms control norms signals a shift toward open-ended strategic rivalry among major powers, including the US, Russia, and China.

4. Global Implications and Non-Proliferation Concerns

• The lapse could weaken global non-proliferation efforts, especially ahead of the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.
• Other nuclear-armed states may feel less constrained, undermining decades of restraint and norm-building.

Significance of the Treaty’s Expiry

1. Strategic Instability
   • The absence of arms control increases uncertainty and the likelihood of arms racing, particularly during geopolitical crises.
2. Collapse of Trust-Building Mechanisms
   • Verification and inspections were crucial confidence-building tools. Their loss erodes transparency and mutual reassurance.
3. Implications for Global Security Architecture
   • The expiry marks a symbolic end to the post-Cold War arms control era, challenging the existing global security framework.
4. Pressure on Non-Proliferation Regimes
   • The erosion of restraint among major nuclear powers weakens the moral and political authority of non-proliferation norms.
5. Need for New Multilateral Arms Control Frameworks
   • The future of arms control may require:
   • Multilateral arrangements,
   • Inclusion of emerging nuclear powers,
   • New rules addressing missile defence, hypersonic weapons, cyber threats, and space-based systems.